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RECENT CASES
Actions-Pennsylvania Declaratory Judgments Act-Existence of Statutory Remedy as Ground for Denial of Declaratory Relief-In 1934, the City
of Erie and the city collector of taxes joined 1 in filing a petition for a declaratory judgment under the Pennsylvania Declaratory Judgments Act, 2 to determine whether the collector had forfeited his right to certain commissions for the
collection of delinquent taxes by failing to make final settlement of the tax duplicates. Held, that the petition should be dismissed, because there were other
"statutory remedies established to meet the situation." 3 City of Erie v. Phillips,
187 Atl. 203 (Pa. 1936).
By the instant decision, which is the result of a decade of apparent misquotation of a statement made by former Chief Justice von Moschzisker in
Kariher's Petition,4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has again erred in giving
to every statutory remedy the effect of depriving the courts of power to grant a
declaratory judgment.- While the general rule is that declaratory relief may not
be rendered if a special statutory remedy has been provided for a specific type
of case, this rule should be interpreted in accordance with English practice, as
declaratory relief is English in origin. And in the British Empire, the words
"special statutory remedy" do not have an omnibus definition, but apply only to
specific types of statutes, 6 as, for example, those regarding tax assessments,
eminent domain, and divorce and annulment of marriage, where it was deemed
more expedient to try the action according to the special statutory procedure,
particularly when a special statutory court had been established.7 In view of this
background, the decision in the instant case seems to be erroneous, and although
i. The court properly pointed out that the fact of joinder of the parties in asking for the
declaratory judgment was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court when otherwise
none existed. Instant case at 203. Accord: Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N. W. 552
(1933).
2. PA. STAT. AiN. (Pardon, 1931) tit. 12, §§ 831-846.
3. The court said that if the collector retained the disputed commissions, then under a
statute (the citation of which was not given) the city controller could surcharge the collector, and sue him in the name of the city for the sum retained. Instant case at 2o4.
4. 284 Pa. 455, 471, 131 Atl. 265, 271 (1925), in which the Chief Justice said that declaratory relief could not be given "where another statutory remedy has been specifically provided
for the character of case in hand." Apprehensive lest the grant of a declaratory judgment in
cases where another remedy was available would effect the abolition of all common law and
equitable forms of relief [Cryan's Estate, 3Ol Pa. 386, 391, 152 Atl. 675, 677 (1930)], the court

in later cases broadened this precise statement of the law. See Leafgreen v. La Bar, 293 Pa.
263, 264, 142 Ati. 224 (1928) ; Nesbitt v. Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co., 310 Pa. 374, 380,
165 Atl. 403, 405 (933) ; Bell Telephone Co. v. Lewis, 313 Pa. 374, 376, 169 Atl. 571, 572
(1934). For a full discussion of the problem involved in the instant case, see Borchard,
Declaratory Judgments in Pennsylvania (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 317, 318 et seq.
5.Pennsylvania, however, is not alone on this point. Moore v. Louisville Hydro-Elec.
Co., 226 Ky. 20, 10 S. W. (2d) 466 (1928) ; Lisbon Village Dist. v. Lisbon, 85 N. H. 173, 155
Atl. 252 (ig3i) ; Stewart v. Herten, 125 Neb. 210, 249 N. W. 552 (933). Contra: Penn v.
Glenn, io F. Supp. 483 (W. D. Ky. 1935) ; Wollenberg v. Tonningsen, 8 Cal. App. (2d) 722,
48 P. (2d) 738 (935) ; Kalman v. Shubert, 27o N. Y. 375, 1 N. E. (2d) 47o (1936).
6. Barraclough v. Brown [1897] A. C. 615; Bull v. Attorney-General [1916] A. C. 564;
North Eastern Marine Eng. Co. v. Leeds Forge Co. [19o6] i Ch. 324; Flint v. AttorneyGeneral [1918] I Ch. 216; Mutrie v. Alexander, 23 Ont. L. P- 396 (1911); New York &
Ottawa Ry. v. Cornwall, 29 Ont. L. M. 522 (1913) ; Attorney-General v. Attorney-General,
20 Com. L. P. 148 (Australia, 1915).

7. See Borhard, The Declaratory Judgment-A Needed Judicial Reform (1918) 28
YALE L. 3. 105, 114.
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reached without recourse to the recent amendment 8 to Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Declaratory judgments Act, the language of the amendment is so confused that the same decision probably would-have been made even under the
amended Act. 9 Therefore, because of the ineffectual nature of the amendment
and because of the extreme improbability that the court will soon overrule itself,
the Act should be carefully re-amended in order to secure for Pennsylvania a
desirable form of relief enjoyed in many other jurisdictions. 10
Admiralty-Liability of Vessel In Rem for Injury to Seaman-An inexperienced seaman was injured by an explosion in the oil-burning equipment
of a steamship. He filed a libel against the vessel for damages, on the ground
that the vessel was at fault because of the owner's failure to give him adequate
instruction and warning with respect to the dangers of the work which he was
required to perform. Held, libellant entitled to damages. Marshall v. Manese,
85 F. (2d) 944 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
As was pointed out by the court, the general rule in maritime law was that a
seaman, while contractually entitled to "maintenance and cure" upon injury even
by accident,' could recover compensatory damages only upon proof that his
injury arose from the unseaworthiness of the vessel or from some defect in the
appliances with which the vessel was furnished,2 and that the vessel and owners
were not liable for any other form of negligence. The court, however, apparently failed to recognize that the Jones Act 3 extended to seamen the rights that
had earlier been given to railway employees, 4 thus permitting recovery of indemnity for any injury resulting from negligence. Although these rights can be
exercised at the seaman's election in an action at law or in admiralty,' a suit in
ren may not be brought under the Jones Act.6 However, the instant case permits a suit having that effect, for the libellant, who was clearly entitled to recover
under the Act,7 brought a libel against the vessel, and the court by expansion
of the recognized grounds of liability in such an action 8 allowed recovery, thus
8. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1935) tit. 12, § 836. This amendment is discussed in
Borchard, Recent Developments in Declaratory Relief (1936) IO TEMPLE L. Q. 233, 234 et
seq.

9. The language of the amendment is so self-contradictory that it is not strange that in
the first case arising after its enactment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adhered to its earlier rule, although the obvious purpose of the amendment was to abolish it. Allegheny County
v. Equitable Gas Co., 321 Pa. 127, 183 Atl. 916 (1936), IO TEMPLE L. Q. 427.

io. See cases cited supra notes 5, 6.
I. See The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 175 (903).
2.

Cortes, Adm'r v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U. S. 367 (1932)

;

see The Osceola, 189

U. S. 158, 175 (1903).
3. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. § 688 (1928).
4. FEDERAL EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ACT, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. A. § 5, (1928).
For the effect of the Jones Act see The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U. S. i1O (1936) ; Nox v.

United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 193 N. Y. Supp. 340 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
5. Panama R. R. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 (1924) ; see Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips,
274 U. S. 316, 324 (1927) ; Lindgren v. United States, 281 U. S. 38, 40 (193o) ; BENEDICT,
ADMIRALTY (5th ed. 1925) § 22.
6. Plamals v. Pinar del Rio, 277 U. S. 15, (1928) ; The Black Gull, 82 F. (2d) 758 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1936).
7. The Act applies ordinary rules of negligence, and it is well settled that a master must
warn an inexperienced servant of special dangers connected with the employment. Mather
v. Rillston, 156 U. S. 39 (895) ; see Casey-Hedges v. Oliphant, 228 Fed. 636, 64o (C. C. A.

6th, 1916).
8. See supra note 2. Courts have held that employers owe to seamen the highest degree
of care as to tools and appliances. The Edith Godden, 23 Fed. 43 (S. D. N. Y. 1885) ; Storgard v. France & Canada S. S. Corp., 263 Fed. 545 (C. C. A. 2d, 192o). As to the duty to
instruct and warn, no cases directly in point have arisen with regard to seamen, but certain
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creating a new form of remedial action when two clearly defined methods of
recovery already existed. But in view of the fact that seamen enjoy a favored
status in the eyes of courts and legislative bodies, 9 this extension of the common
law grounds for recovery of damages for injury in an action in ren in admiralty,
affording a remedy not possible under the Jones Act, seems justified, as it
ensures to the seaman the satisfaction of his claim.

Bankruptcy-Section 77B-Limitation of Collusively Acquired Claims
to Consideration Paid Therefor-A debtor corporation defaulted on its mortgage bonds, and, having petitioned for reorganization under Section 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act,' obtained a stay of the trustee's sale of the mortgaged properties, its sole assets. After this, A Company, seeking to gain control of the reorganization proceedings and to acquire the properties free from shareholders'
equities, induced the bondholders' protective committee to exclude a syndicate
allied with the debtor corporation from bidding for the bonds at the committee's
sale by withholding essential information, and thus acquired 98 per cent. of the
bonds for 4o cents on the dollar. The properties had a then estimated value of
less than the bonded debt due to unusually unfavorable market conditions. The
district court, upon the master's finding of collusion, confirmed the debtor corporation's reorganization plan providing for payment to A Company of only the
consideration paid for the bonds. On appeal, held (one judge dissenting), that
the plan should be rejected and the stay of trustee's sale vacated, since no fiduciary duty toward the debtor corporation had been violated. Security-First Nat.
Bank of Los Angeles v. Rindge Land & Navigation Co., 85 F. (2d) 557 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1936), rehearingdenied, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. ff 4242 (1936).
Although ordinarily under Section 77B a plan of reorganization which is
opposed by two-thirds of any class of creditors whose material interests are
adversely affected thereby may not be confirmed by the court,2 there is some
indication that the Act confers broad equitable powers on the courts in determining what those interests properly are.3 The so-called "scrutiny" clauses,
which empower the courts to limit future rent claims or claims presented by
bondholders' committees to the actual consideration paid therefor,4 seem particularly to extend those powers in regard to questionable activities of bondholders'
committees ' and speculation in claims acquired after the commencement of reorcases have indicated recognition of such a duty. Cf. West Ky. Coal Co. v. Parker's Adm'r,
229 Ky. 685, 17 S. W. (2d) 753 (1929) ; Patterson v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 37 Ohio
App. 316 (393o).

See supra note 7.

9. See The A. Heaton, 43 Fed. 592, 595 (C. C. D. Mass. 189o) ; The Catalonia, 236 Fed.

554, 556 (E. D. Va. 1916) ; McDonald v. United States,

292

Fed. 593, 594 (C. C. A. 2d,

1923).

1. 48 STAT. 932 (1934), 'i U. S. C. A. §207 (Supp. 1936).
2. 48 STAT. 932 (3934), II U. S. C. A. § 207 (e) (Supp. 3936) ; In re Murel Holding
Corp., 75 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; In re Preble Corp., 12 F. Supp. ioo2 (D. Me.
1935).

3. A plan of reorganization not approved by creditors holding two-thirds in amount of

the claims "shall provide . . . adequate protection for the realization by them of the value
of their interests . . . by such method as will in the opinion of the judge, under and con-

sistent with the circumstances of the particular case, equitably and fairly provide such pro-

tection." 48

STAT. 912 (1934),

II

U. S. C. A.

§207

(b) (5) (Supp. 1936).

tutionality of this provision, see In re Tennessee Publishing Co., 8i F.
6th, 1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. REy. 780.

(2d)

On the consti-

463 (C. C. A.

4. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), i U. S. C. A. §207 (b) (5) (Supp. 1936).
5. See Kahn, The New CorporateReorganization Statute (1935) 9 J. N. A. REaF.
II,

14.
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ganization proceedings. 6 Therefore, while in the instant case the claim was not
presented by "a committee member or agent", 7 yet, in the light of the claimant's
obvious domination of the bondholders' committee," the court might well have
refused to allow A Company thus to block the reorganization proceedings. 9
Power to do this is further shown by another clause in 77B which requires that
claimants in accepting a plan of reorganization shall submit statements of what
claims have been acquired by them "after the commencement or in contemplation
of the proceeding, and the circumstances of such purchase or transfer." 1o
If these circumstances are material when claimants accept a plan, it would seem
to follow that they are also material where full payment is insisted upon. The
circuit court based its decision largely on the assumption that the rights of the
debtor corporation had not been invaded, whatever injury might have been
inflicted upon the original bondholders by the collusive transaction. This holding
would seem to deny a right on the part of the debtor, or persons cooperating with
it, to a fair chance of purchasing its own obligations in order to preserve its
assets," despite the fact that one of the primary purposes of 77B was to relieve
debtors paralyzed by just such "frozen" assets.' 2 Furthermore, it unfortunately
intimates that the exploitation of bondholders by their "protective" committees 13
is not a material circumstance in reorganization proceedings unless the bondholders themselves object. The rights of all parties concerned would have been
better served had the court, even though rejecting the proposed plan, continued the
stay of liquidation proceedings long enough to enable the bondholders to acquire
the information essential to their taking appropriate action against their committee, and also to enable the debtor to devise some other plan which might
preserve the equities of the shareholders.

Conflict of Laws-Effect of Decree of Unfitness on Father's Right to
Fix Child's Domicile-In divorce proceedings the custody of a child was
awarded to the mother, and at her death a guardian was appointed because the
father was decreed unfit to have the custody of the child. On the death of the
guardian the father seized the child, took it from Texas into Kentucky and there
had himself appointed guardian of its person and a Kentucky trust company
appointed guardian of its estate. The trust company sought to compel a new
Texas guardian, appointed after the child had been taken into Kentucky, to
deliver to it the child's estate in Texas. Held, that on the death of the guardian
the right to the child's custody vested in the father, and, therefore, the domicile
of the child being the same as the father's, the Kentucky guardian should prevail.
Bradford v. Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. of Ky., 96 S. W. (2d) 821 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936).
6. In re McCrory Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 267 (S. D. N. Y. 1935). See Fried, The
Effect of Section 77B on Real Estate Reorganizations (1935) 4 BRooKLYN L. REv. 310, 336.
7.48 STAT. 912 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. § 207 (b) (5) (Supp. 1936).
8. See instant case at 566, 567.
9. In In re Celotex Co., 12 F. Supp. i (D. Del. 1935), it was held that since the purchaser had not dominated the bondholders' committee, its claim could not be limited under
77B to the consideration paid.
10. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. §207 (e) (i) (Supp. 1936). See 3 GERDES,
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (1936) 1778.
i. Cf. In re New York Rys. Corp., 82 F. (2d) 739 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), in which the
court did not limit the claim of a certain bond purchaser since it had not actively prevented
the debtor from buying the bonds.
12. See Gerdes, Constitutionality of 77B (1935) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 196, 201, 202.
13. The activities of bondholders' protective committees in corporate reorganizations have
been increasingly subjected to criticism in recent years. See Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act (933) 47 HAIv. L. REv. i8, 38, 39.

RECENT CASES
2
While generally the domicile of an unemancipated, 1 4legitimate child is that
3
of its father, when the father has abandoned the child, or has permitted it to
be adopted,5 or when the custody of the child has been awarded to the mother
by a judicial decree, 6 the domicile of the child is held not to be that of its father.
Therefore, as the father's power to fix the domicile of his child appears to rest
upon his right to custody and control,7 it should follow that the father here could
not change the domicile of his son, since he had been deprived of the child's
custody by reason of his unfitness, and such a decree should continue in effect
until set aside by competent proceedings. And furthermore, it hardly seems in
keeping with the principle that the welfare of the child is the primary consideration," to hold as did the instant court, that immediately upon the death of the
guardian the custody of the child vested in the father, who had been deprived of
the custody because of his unfitness, since the unfitness obviously continued. It
would seem that on the death of the guardian, the natural guardian being incompetent, the child should be considered a ward of the court until a new guardian
is appointed. Therefore, as the domicile of the child remained in Texas, the
Kentucky court was without jurisdiction to appoint a guardian, 9 and hence the
Texas guardian should have prevailed.

Constitutional Law-Obligation of Contracts Impaired by Pennsylvania Mortgage Deficiency Judgment Act of ig3-Paintiff mortgagee recovered a judgment against defendant mortgagor, and issued attachment execution
thereon against a bank as garnishee. Defendant sought to restrain such execution on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the Mortgage
Deficiency judgment Act of 1935,1 which required a mortgagee to proceed first
against the mortgaged premises and to have the court fix its "fair value" and
allow a deficiency judgment for the difference between such "fair value" and the
amount of the judgment, interest, and costs. Held, that the statute was unconstitutional, since it continues in force the provisions of the 1934 Act,2 which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously held violated the restrictions against
impairing the obligations of contracts. Siwllcross v. North Branch-Sedgwick
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 187 Atl. 819 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936).
The court followed the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Beaver County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Winozeich,8 criticized in a recent issue of
i. An emancipated minor may acquire a domicile of his own. Bjornquist v. Boston &
A. R. Co., 25o Fed. 929 (C. C. A. 1st, 1918); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 31.
2. An illegitimate child has the domicile of its mother. Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31
Pac. 915 (1892).
3. Note (I914) 49 L. R. A. (x. S.) 86o, and cases cited;
LAWS (1934) § 30.

RESTATEMENT,

CONFLICT OF

4. In re Vance, 92 Cal. 195, 28 Pac. 229 (i8gi) ; People v. Dewey, 23 Misc. 267, 50 N. Y.
Supp. 1013 (Sup. Ct. 1898) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 33.
5. In re Johnson, 87 Iowa 130, 54 N. W. 69 (1893) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1934) § 35.
6. Toledo Traction Co. v. Cameron, 137 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905) ; Fox v. Hicks, 81
Minn. 197, 83 N. W. 538 (19oo) ; Griffin v. Griffin, 95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac. 598 (1920).

7. See Toledo Traction Co. v. Cameron, 137 Fed. 48, 57 (C. C. A. 6th, 1905) ; also see
dissenting opinion in In re Thorne, 24o N. Y. 444, 451, 148 N. E. 63o, 632 (1925).
8. LONG, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (3d ed. 1923) 447, and cases cited.
9. Kline v. Kline, 57 Iowa 386, 1o N. W. 825 (1881) ; It re Hubbard, 82 N. Y. 9o (188o);
Lanning v. Gregory, oo Tex. 310, 99 S. W. 542 (1907); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS

('934) § 117.
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1935) tit. 21, §§ 8o8 et seq.
Id. at § 8o6.
3. 187 Atl. 481 (Pa. 1936).
I.
2.
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the REVIEW. 4 The instant decision was perhaps more justified in holding that
the 1935 Act effected an unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations
inasmuch as it contained a provision, not in the earlier act, which required a
mortgagee to proceed first against the mortgaged property and have a deficiency
judgment fixed by5 the court before he could proceed against any other property
of the mortgagor.

Constitutional Law-Twenty-first Amendment-Commerce ClauseEqual Protection Clause-Validity of State License Fee for Importing Beer
-The California Alcoholic Beverage Control Act levied a $5oo license fee on
each business premises of importers of beer.- Plaintiffs, wholesalers engaged in
selling imported beer, sought to enjoin the enforcement of the tax on the ground
that it discriminated against wholesalers of imported beer and hence violated
both the commerce 2 and equal protection 3 clauses. Held, that the injunction
sought be denied because the Twenty-first Amendment 4 "abrogated the right
(under the commerce clause) to import free, as far as concerns intoxicating
liquors", and "a classification recognized by the Twenty-first Amendment cannot
be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth." State Board of Equalization of Calfornia v. Young's Market Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 77 (1936).
The degree to which the state police power, under the Twenty-first Amendment, may encroach on the commerce clause with regard to intoxicating beverages has been the subject of varying decisions.' No previous decision, however,
has gone so far as to allow the police power to encroach upon the equal protection clause except for one dictum which was clouded by other views presented
with it." And, although the classification here seems valid,7 the reasoning which
led the Supreme Court to sanction the imposition of this license fee against
importers alone seems fallacious. The aim of the legislation, culminating in the
Webb-Kenyon Act," which preceded the Twenty-first Amendment was to pre4. (1936) 85 U. OF

PA. L. REV. 114.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1935)

tit. 21,

§ 8o8. See

(1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv.

792.
1. CAL. AcTs

(Deering, Supp. 1935) no. 3796, §§ 5 (8), 7.

2. U. S. CoNsr. ART.I, § 8,
3. Id. AMEND. XIV, § I.

cl.
3.

4. Id. AMEND. XXI, § 2, provides: "The transportation or importation into any state

. . . for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is

hereby prohibited."
5. To the effect that the Twenty-first Amendment was not intended to except intoxicating liquors from the commerce clause, see Young's Market Co. v. State Board of California,
12 F. Supp. 140 (S. D. Cal. 1935) ; Joseph Triner Corp. v. Arundel, ii F. Supp. 145 (D.
Minn. 1935), 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 252; cf. General Sales & Liquor Co. v. Becker, 14 F. Supp.
348 (E.D. Mo. 1936). Contra: Premier-Pabst Sales Corp. v. Grosscup, 12 F. Supp. 970 (E.
D. Pa. 1935), aff'd on other grounds, 298 U. S. 226 (1936).
6. Premier-Pabst Sales Corp. v. Grosscup, 12 F. Supp. 970 (E. D. Pa. I935), aff'd on
other grounds, 298 U. S. 226 (1936). While the opinion appears to countenance discriminatory state legislation, it maintains that the statute in question would be valid under the WebbKenyon Act (see note 7 infra) without the Twenty-first Amendment, and it is unlikely that
an act of Congress could be valid if it sanctioned legislation repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
7. Importers of beer might well be separately classified and burdened with a heavier tax
because of the greater difficulty to the state in the matter of inspection and control, as well as
the fact that imported beer was subject to no local tax on its manufacture. Cf. the discussion
on pages 323, 324 of this issue of the REVIEW.
8. 37 STAT. 699 (1913), 27 U. S. C. A. § 122 (1927), re-enacted, 49 STAT. 877, 27 U. S.
C. A. § 122 (Supp. 1935), provides: "The shipment . . . of . . . intoxicating liquor
. . . from one state . . . into any other state, . . . which . . . intoxicating liquor
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vent the exclusive power of Congress over interstate commerce from rendering
nugatory state police regulation of the liquor traffic. 9 That the Twenty-first
Amendment was directed at the same evil is apparent not only from the fact that
its wording is nearly identical with that of the Webb-Kenyon Act,10 but from the
discussion in Congress concerning the Amendment, which indicated clearly that
the Amendment was felt necessary only because the Act had been upheld by a
divided court and Congress desired to protect the dry states against the contingency of its repeal or a later adverse decision of the Court."' Therefore, both
the Act and the Amendment were intended to divest the importation of intoxicating liquors of the protection of the commerce clause only when such importation was forbidden by state laws which were otherwise constitutional.'2 There
was no reason for the people to sanction any classification repugnant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. To hold that the Twenty-first Amendment permits
discriminatory classifications is to give it an effect which its terms do not require,
which its history indicates was not intended, and which opens the door to the
evils of retaliatory legislation among the states.

Constitutional Law-Validity of Ordinance Imposing Heavier License
Tax on Non-Resident Businesses-A municipal ordinance imposed a tax of
$5o per year upon all dry cleaners not having a permanent place of business in
the city, for the privilege of collecting garments within the city to be serviced
outside, but taxed residents of the city engaged in the same business only $5 per
year.' Plaintiff brought an action to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance.
Held, that, as the taxes levied by the ordinance did not apply equally to the
classes upon which they were imposed, the injunction should be granted.
Speier's Laundry Co. v. Wilber, 269 N. W. 119 (Neb. 1936).
Plaintiff baking corporation, which delivered by trucks to merchants, sought
to enjoin the enforcement of a similar ordinance applicable to bakeries.2 Held,
that the injunction should be refused, as the ordinance was not in contravention
of the "equal protection clause" of the Federal Constitution." American Bakeries
Co. v. Huntsville, 168 So. 88o (Ala. 1936).
To be valid, an ordinance which attempts to distinguish on the ground of
residence between persons engaged in the same business must be based not merely
on the fact that resident and non-resident businesses ipso facto differ, but rather
is intended . . . to be . . . in any manner used . . . in violation of any law of such
state . . . is hereby prohibited." The title states that its purpose is to divest "intoxicating
liquors of their interstate character in certain cases."
9.See Rogers, Interstate Commerce in Intoxicating Liquors Before the Webb-Kenyon
Act (1916) 4 VA. L. REV. 174.
io. Compare wording, supra notes 4 and 8.
ii. See 76 CONG. REc. 2199, 4140-4141, 4170-4172 (1933). After reviewing the evils of
the liquor traffic into dry states before the Eighteenth Amendment, Senator Borah stated,
"All this was sought to be remedied by the Webb-Kenyon Act, and I am very glad indeed the

able Senator from Arkansas has seen fit to recognize the justice and fairness to the States of
incorporatingit permanently in the Constitution of the United States." 76

(1933).

CONG.

REc. 4172

(Italics added.)
12. Compare Commonwealth v. One Dodge Motor Truck, 187 Atl. 461 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1936), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 222.
i. Cited in Speier's Laundry Co. v. Wilber, 269 N. W. 11g, I2O (Neb. 1936).
2. Cited in American Bakeries Co. v. Huntsville, 168 So. 88o, 881 (Ala. 1936).

A tax

of $300 is imposed upon bakeries located outside the city but which sell products within the
city, and a tax of $IOO upon sellers of bakery products having regular places of business
within the city.
3. U. S. CoisT. AMEND. XIV.
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on substantial differences between them arising from that fact. 4 While many
courts refuse to recognize any reasonable basis for the separate treatment of
businesses having no permanent establishment within the city,5 there appears to
be a trend toward sustaining the validity of such legislation on the ground that
there is a difference in the mode of transacting business, an analogy being drawn
to the familiar license taxes upon peddlers.6 However, as both resident and
non-resident firms in the same trade usually conduct their business in the same
manner, delivering their products from door to door, this ground does not appear
to be entirely tenable. But nevertheless, there is sufficient justification for supporting such a classification. In the first place, public policy favors the local
merchant whose economic stability is threatened by a continual flow of competitors. Secondly, the local merchant pays additional taxes and expenses and has
a limited number of customers, and finally, the non-resident trader should be
required to share the burdens of the local government, as he profits from his
business within the city.7 Of course, on the other hand, he pays taxes to the
city in which he is established, and must bear hauling charges in excess of those
of local merchants. But on the whole, such considerations would indicate that the
imposition of higher license fees on non-resident businesses, while somewhat
provincial and subject to the same attack upon economic grounds as national
tariffs," are still reasonable, and therefore a constitutional classification.

Corporations-Shareholder Failing to Consent to Recapitalization Plan
Not Entitled on Later Dissolution to Preferential Rights Obtained by Consenting Shareholders-Holders of par value preferred shares, entitled to
unpaid cumulative dividends, were invited by a corporation under a recapitalization plan to exchange their stock, by a certain date, for no par participating preferred shares entitling the holders to a preference over holders of the old preferred shares.1 The great majority of shareholders surrendered their shares
for the new issue, waiving their rights to the cumulative dividends on the old
shares, but plaintiff neither expressly dissented from this plan nor turned in his
shares within the time limit.2 Upon the dissolution of the corporation, three
months later, he demanded of the trustees the right to participate equally in the
assets with the holders of the new preferred shares, there being no funds to pay
4. Chalker v. Birmingham Ry., 249 U. S. 522 (i919); Williams v. Bowling Green, 254
Ky. II, 70 S. W. (2d) 967 (934) ; Ex parte Baker, 127 Tex. Cr. 589, 78 S. W. (2d) 6io
('935).
5. Ward Baking Co. v. Fernandina, 29 F. (2d) 789 (S. D. Fla. 1928) ; Hair v. Humboldt, 133 Kan. 67, 299 Pac. 268 (1931) ; Grantham v. Chickasha, I56 Okla. 56, 9 P. (2d) 747
(1932) ; Ex parte Baker, 127 Tex. Cr. 589, 78 S. W. (2d) 6io (1935).
6. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U. S. 304 (1914) ; Campbell Baking Co.
v. Harrisonville, 5o F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 8th, 193I) ; State v. Gray, 96 S. W. (2d) 447
(Ark. 1936); Greenleaf & Crosby Co. v. Coleman, 117 Fla. 723, i58 So. 42, (934); Williams v. Bowling Green, 254 Ky. II, 70 S. W. (2d) 967 (i934). The analogy is not entirely
valid, since the ordinary ordinance imposes a tax upon peddlers whether or not they have
established places of business within the city, so that even resident merchants are subject to
the tax if, in addition to the business conducted at the place of their establishment, they carry
on an itinerant trade.
7. See Richmond Linen Supply Co. v. Lynchburg, i6o Va. 644, 169 S. E. 554 (933).
8. See PATTERSON AND SCHOLz, EcONOMIC PROBLEMS OF MODERN LIFE (2d ed. 1931)
230-248.

I. Under the authority of N. Y. CONs. LAws (Cahill, i93o) c. 6o, §§ 36, 37.
2. "If the certificate alters the preferential rights of any outstanding shares, any holder
of such shares not voting in favor of such alteration, within twenty days after the meeting at
which such alteration was authorized, may object thereto and demand payment for his
shares. . . ." N. Y. Co Ns. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 6o, § 38, subdivision 12.
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him after payment to the new shareholders. Held, that the plaintiff could not
so participate, because only those who had accepted the new shares were parties
to the contract by which the preferential rights to the assets were created.
Matter of Duer, 270 N. Y. 343, I N. E. (2d) 457 (1936).
Although the New York Stock Corporation Law did not beyond all doubt
authorize a corporation to issue new shares having preferential rights superior
to the preferred shares then outstanding, the legislature probably intended corporations to have that power,3 and the exercise of it has been assumed to be
valid. 4 Here, the question was raised as to the acts necessary to vest in a holder
of outstanding shares having cumulative dividend rights, the incidents of ownership of new shares having preferential rights in the assets in case of dissolution.
In the first place, plaintiff as a holder of the old shares should not have been
treated as having automatically become a holder of the new shares upon their
authorization, because the new shares were to go only to those who gave up their
cumulative dividend rights, which probably could not be taken from the plaintiff
without his consent.5 Secondly, the offer of the new shares demonstrated that the
corporation did not intend those who failed to turn in their old certificates to be
entitled to the new shares.6 Furthermore, the plaintiff's failure to dissent to the
change in preferential rights within the twenty day time limit fixed by statute
did not show a willingness to exchange them for the new shares. If plaintiff
wished to retain his cumulative dividend rights, rather than to forego them for
the immediate cash value of his shares, he properly failed to dissent, for express
dissent, coupled with a demand for an appraisal and purchase of his shares, would
have led to his giving up those rights. And finally, by the passing of the fixed
time limit set by the corporation, the shareholder lost his power to accept the corporation's offer of new shares.7 The court, consequently, properly refused to treat
him as if he had gained preferential rights to the assets upon dissolution, as he
had not foregone his right to unpaid cumulative dividends.
Insurance Law-Effect of Premium Payment and Issuance of Binding
Receipt When Policy Does Not Conform to Terms of Receipt-Plaintiff, a
coal miner, paid defendant's agent the "estimated" premium on a life insurance
3. Section 36, which enumerates in detail the changes which a stock corporation may
effect in respect to shares or capital stock, nowhere explicitly specifies that the preferential
rights of outstanding shares may be altered by the creation of new shares, but § 37, subdivision 3-c, provides for the filing of a certificate pursuant to § 36, along with an affidavit,
"if such certificate alters the preferences of outstanding shares of any class or authorizes
shares having preferences which are in any respect superior to those of outstanding
shares. . . ." N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) C.6o, § 37, subdivision 3-c.
4. Matter of Silberkraus, 25o N. Y. 242, 165 N. E. 279 (1929) (discussed only the power
to dissent, assuming the power to alter preferential rights).
5. Keller v. Wilson, Del. Sup. Ct., Nov. 10, 1936, wherein it was held that the privileges
of a preferred stockholder constituted a vested property right, and, although 99 per cent. of
the preferred stockholders had agreed to give up that right, to deprive the other one per cent.,
without their consent, of those privileges was a violation of the "due process clause". The
plaintiff was there seeking to retain his right to cumulative dividends in cash, while in the
instant case the plaintiff was seeking to be treated as if he had given up that right.
6. See instant case at 347, 1 N. E. (2d) at 458.
7. "The power to create a contract by acceptance of an offer terminates at the time specified in the offer. . . ." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 40. Courts have emphasized
the necessity of a shareholder's taking positive action within a fixed time limit to obtain
shares, in analogous situations. First, when shareholders agree to reorganize an insolvent
corporation, equity will not permit those who failed to turn in their shares by the set date to
later claim shares in the reorganized corporation. Gresham v. Island City Say. Bank, 21 S.
W. 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893). Accord: Keane v. Moffly, 217 Pa. 24o, 66 Atl. 319 (1907).
Second, when a shareholder in a solvent corporation fails to exercise his pre-emptive rights
within a limited and reasonable period, he is deemed to have waived those rights. Noble v.
Great American Ins. Co., 20o App. Div. 773, 194 N. Y. Supp. 6o (1st Dep't, 1922).
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policy to be issued with double indemnity and disability provisions. The receipt
given to the plaintiff recited that the policy was to take effect immediately, "providing the applicant is . . . an insurable risk . . . and the application is otherwise acceptable on the plan and for the amount and at the rate of premium".
Right days later the defendant mailed to the plaintiff a policy providing for semiannual premiums, starting with the date of issuance, in which the double indemnity-feature was omitted and the premium rate increased because of the plaintiff's occupation. In the meantime the plaintiff suffered disability, and sued on
the policy. Held (Maxey, J. dissenting), for the plaintiff, because the policy
was effective as of the date the agent issued the receipt. Stonsz v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. of the United States, 187 Atl. 403 (Pa. 1936).
1
It has long been settled that a contract of insurance may be either oral
2
or written, and therefore, the receipt in the instant case may be regarded as
either: (i) evidence of an oral offer to enter into a contract of insurance, the
agent being a conduit through which this offer was transmitted to the insurance
company, (2) evidence of an oral contract of insurance entered into by the agent
on behalf of the insurance company, 4 with a condition subsequent, i. e. the disapproval of the company, which would divest the insurance company of any obligation under the contract, or (3) evidence of a contract of insurance with a condition precedent, i. e., the approval of the insurance company, the occurrence
of which was necessary to the creation of any liability to the insured.5 If the
transaction whereby the premium was paid and the receipt6 given were considered an offer, then it would seem that the offer was rejected, and a counter-offer
sent to the plaintiff when the insurance company refused to issue a policy according to the terms of the receipt,7 but offered instead death benefits and disability
coverage at a higher premium. Furthermore, since no provision of the policy
specifically referred to an effective date, and as the policy was dated after the
disability, and the premium was due semi-annually at a date which corresponded
to the date of the policy, the intent of the parties must have been that the insurance be effective at that time," so that the defendant should not have been liable
for a previous disability. However, the terms of the receipt implied that an oral
i. Wilson v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 188 Ill. App. 181 (1914); Newark Mach. Co. v.

Kenton Ins. Co., 5o Ohio St. 549, 35 N. E. io6o (1893) ; Haskin v. Agricultural Fire Ins.
Co., 78 Va. 700 (1884).
2.

(1926)

In some states, however, statutes require that the policy be written. E. g.,

GA. CODE

§ 2470.

3. The court in the instant case apparently so regarded it. However, the transaction
was also termed a contract with a condition precedent (at 406), and a contract with a condition subsequent (at 407).
4. See VANCE, INsuRANcE (1930) 194.
5. Armstrong v. State Ins. Co., 61 Iowa 212, 16 N. W. 94 (1883); Picket v. German Fire

Ins. Co., 39 Kan. 697, 18 Pac. 9o3 (1888).
6. The court reasoned that the receipt showed the insured had made an offer with three

severable parts, and that since the insurer had accepted two of these three parts, including
disability benefits, the insured was covered by disability insurance under the terms of his
offer. This view was unwarranted. 2 PARSONS, CONTRACTS (9th ed. 1904) 519, says: "If
the consideration to be paid is single and entire, the contract must be held to be entire, although the subject of the contract may consist of several distinct dependent items." Although
this rule should not be applied indiscriminately, it is applicable in the present instance, when
there is no other evidence of the intention of the parties. Accord: Aetna Ins. Co. v. Resh, 44
Mich. 55, 6 N. W. 114 (i88o) ; McClurg v. Price, 59 Pa. 52o (1869) ; Hinman v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 159 (1874) ; cf. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (932) § 266 (3).
7. State ex rel. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U. S. v. Robertson, 191 S. W. 989 (Mo.
1916).

8. Home Life & Accident Co. v. Compton, 144 Ark. 561, 222 S. W. lO63 (1920) ; New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 129 Miss. 544 (1922); Haynes v. Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co.,
6o S. D. 212, 244 N. W. iio (1932) ; Long v. New York Life Ins. Co., io6 Wash. 458, i8o
Pac. 479 (0919).
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contract already had been formed,9 the effective date being the date of the receipt.
If that were so, and if the disapproval of the insurance company were considered a condition subsequent, then when the company expressed its disapproval
by sending a different policy to the insured who did not comply with0 its rules,
But the
the company was divested of any obligation under the oral contract.'
wisdom of adding to those situations in which a subsequent condition will divest
a contract of its obligation is questionable."' Therefore, the transaction here is
best considered as a contract in which the insurance company's approval of the
oral contract and the insurability of the plaintiff for the estimated premium
were conditions precedent to liability. This approval was withheld, and consewhich did not take
quently the policy was at most an offer of a new contract,
2
effect until after the disability had been suffered.'

Taxation-Exemption of Property of Charitable Institution-Plaintiff
Y. M. C. A. occupied a five-story building, three floors being devoted to dormitories used exclusively by members at an average weekly price per room of
$5, although those unable to pay were admitted free. The money thus gained
supplied nearly half the association's operating income in some years. That
part of the property represented by the dormitories was assessed for county real
estate taxes, under a statute exempting "all . . . institutions of .

.

charity

with the grounds thereto annexed and necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment of the same." ' Plaintiff appealed from the order. Held, that the dormitories were a commercial operation not so clearly necessary for the occupancy
and enjoyment of the remainder of the building as to merit exemption from taxation under the act. Young Men's ChristianAss'n v. Philadelphia,323 Pa. 4O,
187 Ati. 204 (1936).
Where public charities are exempt from taxation, 2 the courts agree that it
is the use to which the property of such an organization is put which determines
purposes being
its exemption,2 property used primarily for immediate charitable
exempt although it may yield certain incidental profits, 4 whereas property used
primarily for profit is not exempt although all the proceeds may be devoted to
the support of the organization. 5 In deciding that the instant case fell within
the latter rule, the court apparently departed from precedent in Pennsylvania 6
9. Binding receipts are usually so interpreted.
10. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 396.
II.

VANCE, INSURANCE (1930)

194.

See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Willis. and Thomp. ed. 1936) § 667.

12. See cases cited supra note 8.
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1935) fit. 72, § 5020-204 (c). The statute was passed
in accordance with art. IX, § 1 (4) of the state constitution, which allows the legislature to
exempt from taxation "institutions of purely public charity". It is to be noted that this wording of the statute has not changed since 1874. See Barnes Foundation v. Keeley, 314 Pa. 112,120, 121, M~'Atl. 267, 270 (1934).

2. This condition exists by statute in practically all states. See Baker, Tax Exemption
Statutes (1928) 7 TEx. L. Rzv. 5o, 56; Note (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. 724.
3. Board of County Comm'rs v. Denver & R. G. R. R. Relief Ass'n, 70 Colo. 592, 203
Pac. 850 (1922) ; Theta Xi Bldg. Ass'n v. Board of Review, 217 Iowa I81, 251 N. W. 76
(1933).

4. House of the Good Shepherd v. Board of Equalization, 113 Neb. 489, 2o3 N. W. 632
(1925), 2o MINN. L. REv. 358; House of Refuge v. Smith, 140 Pa. 387, 21 Atl. 353 (1891).
5. People ex re. Baldwin v. Jessamine Withers Home, 312 Ill. 136, 143 N. E. 424 (1924);
American Sunday School Union v. Philadelphia, 161 Pa. 307, 29 Atl. 26 (1894) ; see cases
cited in Note (1925) 34 A. L. R. 634, 659 et seq., and as to Y. M. C. A.'s specifically, Note
(1925) 34 A. L. R. io67, 2072-75.
6. Philadelphia v. Women's Christian Ass'n, 125 Pa. 572, 17 Atl. 475 (1889) ; Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Hospital for the Insane, 254 Pa. 9, 25 Atl. 1076 (1893) (special build-
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and elsewhere,7 thus indicating a new intention to strictly construe the exemption of "purely public charities." 8 Moreover, in holding that the operation of
the dormitory was not "necessary" for the enjoyment of the remainder of the
building, the court ignored the authority that "necessary" is to be construed as
not absolutely so, but only reasonably so in the opinion of the directors of the
association; 9 and certainly a dormitory is reasonably necessary, in that it provides decent quarters for members having no home in the city, allowing them
to take fuller advantage of what the association offers. The decision seems to
have been motivated by several factors: first, the apprehension that if the court
were to concede this step, it would also have to exempt association restaurants,
barber shops, etc., 10 but such fears need be realized only in the rare cases where
the public is excluded from those operations.:" Secondly, the court assumed that
the operation of a dormitory and the leasing of property to a third party were
identical, 12 when in fact this may constitute just the difference between reasonable and unreasonable necessity under the statute. While in view of the rising
cost of government and the unfairness of any special privileges to groups not
under public control, it would be desirable to reduce the amount of tax-exempt
property,'1 that end should be attained preferably by a repeal of the exemption
statute, and not by an unwarranted construction of the existing one with the
inevitability of discrimination among institutions of equal merit.

Taxation-Federal Estate Tax-Reimbursement of Residuary Legatees
by Beneficiaries of Inter Vivos Revocable Trust-Testator, who had created
a revocable trust inter vivos, died leaving a residuary estate. The executor, having for patients able to pay prices set at a level yielding a gross profit from the running of
that building, which "apparent profit" was used for the general expenses, held exempt). The
court supposedly distinguished between the instant case and the former by saying that there
was no proof here that lodging was furnished at less than cost, but then said that whether a
profit is made was "wholly immaterial". Instant case at 411-413, 187 Atl. at 209. No
attempt was made to explain the second case. In the lower courts, see Y. M. C. A. v. Easton,
3 D. & C. 562 (Pa. 1922) ; Y. M. C. A.'s Appeal, 15 D. & C. 421 (Pa. ig3o).
7. In re Syracuse Y. M. C. A., 126 Misc. 431, 213 N. Y. Supp. 35 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ; Commonwealth v. Lynchburg Y. M. C. A., 115 Va. 745, 8o S. E. 589 (914), cited with approval
in 2 CooLEY, TAXATioN (4th ed. 1924) § 787; Ottawa Y. M..C. A. v. Ottawa, 29 Ont. L. Rep.
Contra: St. Louis Y. M. C. A. v. Gehner, 329 Mo. 1007, 47 S. W. (2d) 776
574 (913).
The court also ignored the strong analogy to the exemption of college dormitories,
(1932).
for which students pay substantial prices. Yale Univ. v. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316, 42 Atl.
87 (1899) ; Chicago v. Univ. of Chicago, 228 Ill. 605, 8i N. E. 1138 (1907) ; State v. Carleton
College, 154 Minn. 280, i9i N. W. 400 (1923).
8. This indication is strengthened by the court's demand that a "charity" must (i) give
services at a nominal or no charge to (2) legitimate subjects of charity. Instant case at 411,
412, 187 At. at 2og. Compare such requirements with the definition in Episcopal Academy v.
Philadelphia, ISo Pa. 565, 572, 573, 25 Atl. 55, 56 (1892).
9. Barnes Foundation v. Keeley, 314 Pa. 112, 17x Atl. 267 (1934) (embracing the ideas
of convenience and usefulness for the purpose intended) ; see Foerderer v. Philadelphia, iii
Pa. Super. 328, 330, 17o AtI. 708, 709 (i934) (held not reasonable). See also Emerson v.
Trustees of Milton Academy, 185 Mass. 414, 415, 7o N. E. 442 (i9o4).
10. Instant case at 414, 187 AtI. at :2io.
ii. See Y. W. C. A. v. New York, 217 App. Div. 406, 216 N. Y. Supp. 248 (ist Dep't,
1926), where a cafeteria run by the association was not exempted since the public was admitted. In fact, in the instant case a lunch counter was run by the association for its members.
and no claim of taxation was made as to it. Instant case at 404, 187 Atl. at 206.
12. Practically all the cases from other states cited by the court were cases of leases to
third parties. Instant case at 421-424, 187 Ati. at 213, 214. Although the court justly minimized the importance of admitting only members to the dormitories when any person could
become a member, the cost and possible inconvenience of obtaining membership should not
be entirely ignored, and members when admitted are obviously not lessees or third parties.
13. Hughes, Tax Exemption (1935) 13 TENN. L. REv. 79.
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ing paid the federal estate tax,' including that portion chargeable against the
corpus of the trust,2 contended that the residuary legatees were entitled to reimbursement from the beneficiaries of an amount equal to the tax attributable to
the assets of the trust. Held, that the residuary legatees must bear the entire
burden of the tax. In re Ely's Trust Estate, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 28,
p. I, col. 5 (Phila. Orph. Ct. 1936).
Since the estate tax is imposed, at least nominally, upon the right of the
decedent to transfer his estate rather than upon the privilege of succeeding to
property,3 and as the residuary legatees are entitled to the residue only after
payment of all expenses chargeable to the estate, 4 beneficiaries of the trust were
held to be under no duty to reimburse the residuary legatees.5 The tax in question was clearly an obligation of the estate, 6 and it ought to be payable like any
expense which falls under the head of administration,7 and result in a reduction
of the residue." Some courts have expressed this conclusion by the "presumption" that in the absence of a declaration by the donor relative to the payment
of the tax, his intention was that the ultimate weight of taxation should rest
where the law places it in the first instance. 9 However, although it may seem
inconsistent to apportion among the beneficiaries the burden of a tax graduated
according to the size of the total estate, a case may easily arise in which a trust
fund is so much larger than the testamentary estate that the payment of the
estate tax would entirely destroy the latter. To meet this inequality, New York
has passed a statute which prorates the tax in the proportion that the value of
the property of the beneficiary bears to the total value of the estate.10 That such
an enactment is desirable becomes clear when it is remembered that creditors
of the decedent can look only to the testamentary estate. 1 Furthermore, the
surviving spouse, who is often the residuary legatee, may see the estate considerably diminished, rendering even less valuable an election to take against the
will. 12 Therefore, to eliminate an inequitable incidence of taxation it would be
well to adopt more widely statutes similar to that of New York."
.44 STAT. 69 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §410 (1935).
2. Revocable trusts are included in the gross estate. 44 STAT. 69 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A.
§411 (1935) ;Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929) ; Porter v. Comm'r of
Int. Rev., 288 U. S. 436 (1933).
3. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900) ;4 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 1722.
4. Langstroth v. Golding, 41 N. J. Eq. 49, 3 Atl. 15, (1886) ; Heermans v. Robertson, 64
N. Y. 332 (1876) ; Riegelman's Estate, 174 Pa. 476, 34 Atl. 22o (1896).
5. Accord: Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N. Y. 488, 144 N. E. 769
(1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 633 (1924); cf. Newton's Estate, 74 Pa. Super. 361 (292o).
6. 44 STAT. 69 (2926), 26 U. S. C. A. §427 (1935) ; Page v. Skinner, 298 Fed. 731 (E. D.
I1 2924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 625 (1924).
7. Corbin v. Townshend, 92 Conn. 502, 2O3 At. 647 (1918).
8. See supra note 4.
9. See Y. M. C. A. v.Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 51 (1924) ; Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131,
134, 14o N. E. 686, 687 (923).
10. N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, Supp. 1935) c. 61, § 249.
II.See State Bank of Clinton v. Barnett, 250 Ill. 312, 319, 95 N. E. 178, 18o (1911). But
if the intent of the settlor was to defraud creditors, the property may be traced and attached.
Graham's Adm'r v. English, 16o Ky. 375, 169 S. W. 836 (1914) ; see Penn Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Hunt, 237 Mass. 241, 243, 129 N. E. 391, 393 (2921).
12. A spouse taking against the will cannot take personalty placed in trust for the benefit of others. Ellmaker v. Ellmaker, 4 Watts 89 (Pa. 1835) ; Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 281
(i868) ; Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 Atl. 721 (1932).
13. Cited supra note IO. And the federal estate tax, itself, provides for reimbursement by
the beneficiaries of the tax on that portion of the corpus consisting of life insurance policies.
44 STAT.69 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §411 (g) (935).

